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of barriers to housing finance innovation, and in light of these barriers, the problems of some 
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continuous workout mortgages (CWMs).  
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Why Is Housing Finance Still Stuck in Such a Primitive Stage? 
By ROBERT J. SHILLER 
 
Modern financial theory suggests some fundamental modifications to the institutions 
supporting housing, and yet nothing fundamental has happened to the standard mortgage contract 
between the homeowner and originator since the long-term fixed-rate self-amortizing mortgage 
was widely adopted in the U.S. in the 1930s, replacing the then-standard 3-5-year balloon-
payment mortgage (Bartlett 1989, Green and Wachter, 2005). The U.S. mortgage industry has 
maintained this type of mortgage despite the mathematical finance revolution of the second half 
of the twentieth century, which suggests many important innovations. 
 
I. Reasons for Slowness of Innovation in Mortgage Finance 
There are quite a number of reasons why technology for homeownership has progressed 
more slowly than in other areas. 
Experimentation with new mortgage forms is costly since it must deal directly with the broad 
public, creating costs of publicity, battles with regulators, and risks of lawsuits. The benefits of 
the experimentation are usually public goods, available to other mortgage originators, so benefits 
to innovators do not defray the experimentation costs. While financial patents have been awarded 
in the United States since the 1990s, they are weak because prior art may be impossible to 
ascertain until after the costly experimentation has gone on long enough to prove the value of the 
innovation. 
Experimentation with long-term financial innovations such as mortgages may take a lifetime 
to prove itself completely. 
Any new markets associated with the innovation will not get liquidity for such a long time, 
and hence may not even get started. 
Mistrust by the general public of the financial community encourages the use of boilerplate 
mortgage contracts, virtually the same for all. The consumer thereby knows that he or she is 
getting the same treatment as others. This discourages mortgage contracts tailored to individual 
needs. 
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Public attention is episodic: no attention is paid to some potential rare big events until they 
actually happen. A tendency to think in terms of historical determinism leads people to think that 
exigencies of the past will not repeat themselves, and they tend even to forget about these  
events, rather than prepare for repeats of them. Financial crises of historic importance may spur 
institutional change, but only in the crisis countries, leaving observers puzzled later why some 
countries have an innovation and others do not. 
Selection bias may compromise experimentation that would work better if the innovation 
were widely adopted. This is especially significant for products as important as mortgages, 
which attract focused attention because of their importance, and early adopters of innovative new 
mortgage forms may have special circumstances or exploitative motivations. 
Innovators in financial institutions have no incentive to consider externalities, of course. The 
citizenship externality, that homeownership seems to encourage a public spirit, is well known. 
Externalities must also be considered in other behavioral terms. A well-designed mortgage may 
for example serve as a stimulus to saving, to get over the myopic tendency to postpone saving, 
for it puts people on a routine schedule of regular payments on principal, but mortgage 
originators do not profit from this benefit. The saving incentive is weakened by the lack of 
homeowner mortgage risk management. 
The importance of mortgages as incentives to save is a relatively recent phenomenon, and 
hence still not part of mortgage lore. A century ago, people did not have as much incentive to 
save for retirement because they did not expect to live to retire, and few saved for their children’s 
college because few even went to college. Changes like these cause changes in ideal mortgage 
contracts which may be difficult to motivate to the public. 
Sophisticated innovations that rely on data sources, such as home price indices, cannot be 
implemented until the accurate indices are publicly provided, and with enough history to permit 
understanding the properties of the data. There is a chicken-egg problem: index providers may 
not have an incentive to supply them suitable for contract settlement until there are contracts that 
demand it, and so contracts do not have the index to get started. 
Advantages that lie in the realm of behavioral economics may be poorly understood. For 
example, it was not until the behavioral economics revolution of the 1990s that many people 
fully understood that many people would benefit from a nudge to save. 
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II. The Widespread Adoption in the U.S. of Long-Term Self-Amortizing Mortgages 
 While before the 1930s some U.S. lenders, particularly building and loans, issued long-
term self-amortizing mortgages, also called installment mortgages or level-payment mortgages, 
they were not the standard.  That they were rare then may seem a mystery today, but clearly 
people did not see the need for any such thing until the first U.S. national housing crisis came 
1925-33, and U.S. home prices fell 30% at the same time that unemployment rose from 4.9% to 
23.4%. 
The self-amortizing mortgage had had some unfortunate association with installment credit 
which proliferated for consumer durables starting in the 1880s. Jokingly called “consumptive 
credit,” and associated with sleazy operations and door-to-door salesmen, it was criticized as 
abusive since it made ownership look too easy and encouraged excessive indebtedness (Calder, 
1999). 
Upton Sinclair’s 1906 book muckraking book The Jungle has its protagonist Jurgis signing a 
contract to buy a house with a $300 down payment and 100 monthly $12 installment payments. 
After he unavoidably missed some monthly payments, he lost not only the house but also claim 
to the downpayment and all monthly payments he had already made. 
It took the intervention of the government to bring long-term self-amortizing mortgages to a 
new standard that was respected and trusted by the public. 
Before the financial crisis of the 1930s, there seemed to be no major problem with the 
balloon-payment.. Homeowners who missed payments could always sell the property and pocket 
home equity, then could rent, and there was no stigma in renting then, as most people were 
renters, could try again later. There was no significant national nominal home price decline in the 
U.S. between 1890 and 1925, and so there seemed little risk of homeowners becoming 
underwater (just as there was no such decline between 1950 and 2000, before the recent crisis). 
 
III. Price-Level-Adjusted Mortgages 
Under the pressure of high inflation, starting in the 1970s, the economics profession seemed 
to develop a consensus that hedging instruments for CPI risk should be created. Milton Friedman 
wrote in February 1984: “Any individual entering into a contract for a future date could hedge 
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himself against inflation uncertainty...” Paul Samuelson wrote that the then-new CPI-W futures 
contract at the Coffee Sugar and Cocoa Exchange makes “a valuable new contribution in 
permitting hedges against unforeseeable variability in rates of inflation.” 
The price-level-adjusted mortgage (PLAM) was introduced in the early 1980s, and had some 
serious advocacy: Modigliani and Lessard (1984). 
But both CPI futures and the PLAMS have fizzled, even though inflation uncertainty 
remains. The failure reflects some of the principles outlined in Section I. above. 
 
IV. Mortgages Managing Housing Capital Risks 
Shared appreciation mortgages (SAMs), which offered some risk management of home price 
appreciation, were offered by the Bank of Scotland and Bear Stearns in the 1990s, but acquired a 
damaged reputation with the boom in home prices. U.K. homeowners who took such mortgages, 
and lost out on the speculative gains, were so angered that they filed a class-action lawsuit 
against the issuers. The suit was dropped, but the reputation loss was permanent. 
The housing market partnership was advocated by Andrew Caplin, Sewin Chan, Charles 
Freeman and Joseph Tracy (1994), which would allow homeowners to sell part of their home to 
investors, thereby lessening their own home price risks. 
I have proposed (2008) the creation of continuous workout mortgages (CWMs), which have 
a preplanned workout procedure that constantly adjusts mortgage balance and payments to an 
index of local home prices. By tying workouts to an index, rather than the own home price, a 
moral hazard problem is solved.  
With Rafal Wojakowski, Mark Shackleton and M. Shahid Ebrahim, we have worked out 
some of the pricing issues (2013a) and have done a simulation that reveals substantial welfare 
gain to creating autormatic workout mortgages (AWMs) (2013b). 
These mortgages might be combined with housing partnerships to get part of the benefit of 
both: both specificity to the home’s own risks and reduced moral hazard. 
There has been some questioning of the assumption that insuring homeowners against a 
decline in home value is a good thing. Sinai and Soulelis (2014) have written that the existing 
mortgage institutions may be close to optimal given that people want to live in their house 
forever, or move to a similar house whose price is correlated with the present house, and so are 
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perfectly hedged. But their paper cannot be exactly right, given the sense of distress that 
homeowners are experiencing who are underwater. They are more certainly not right about all 
homeowners, many of whom actually plan to sell their home when they retire. 
There is an emerging trend in the United States and other countries, even in the emerging 
world, towards elderly people finishing their years in continuing care retirement communities 
(CCRCs). Today, 65% to 75% of U.S. CCRCs ask prospective tenants, in addition for a monthly 
fee, to an upfront entry fee, when they enter the facility, which allows them to guarantee that no 
one is evicted for running out of money. The average fee in the U.S. in 2010 was $248,000, close 
to the median price of an existing home (CCRC Task Force, 2010). The decline in home values 
with the financial crisis thus caused a CCRC vacancy crisis. 
The CCRC crisis is mending itself with rising home prices, but must not be forgotten, for it 
reflects a fundamental problem. 
 
V. Steps Forward 
  Derivative markets for owner-occupied homes, which might have facilitated the issuance of 
mortgage risk management contracts, at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in 2006 and at the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange in 2012, and in other markets, faced numerous obstacles to 
success, see Fabozzi et al. (2010). Markets like these might yet catch on, supported by such 
innovations as the new REO-to-rental securitizations demonstrated by the Blackstone Group in 
late 2013. 
The difficulties in making improvements in mortgage institutions have to do with the 
complexity of the risk management problem, coupled with mistrust of institutional players. The 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, created by the Dodd-Frank Act and having authority 
over mortgages, among other things, seems oriented towards addressing complaints from the 
public, and has focused its attention so far on such things as unfair collection practices, bias 
against minorities, and excessive complexity of financial products being used to confuse 
customers. These are laudable concerns, but complaints that economists might register about the 
fundamental success of mortgage products to serve risk management well have not yet taken 
center stage. 
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There is an important role for government support of research as a public good that improves 
our understanding of the basic risk management problem that people face in their housing tenure 
decisions. Alternative forms of mortgage need to be studied on a scientific basis. The New 
Development economics, Karlan and Appel (2011), Bannerjee and Duflo (2012) has shown how 
carefully controlled experiments can reveal solid steps to take regarding new financial 
institutions for poverty reduction. The same methods could be used to improve mortgage 
institutions, as well as rental, leasing, partnership and cooperative institutions, in advanced 
countries. 
It is important to subsidize applied research in behavioral economics, on perceptions of risk 
and on myopia concerning risks, relevant to understanding why the public does not demand 
better risk management with their mortgages. 
Governments should also subsidize research on measuring risk factors relevant to housing 
tenure, possibly using procedures such as hedonic repeated-measure home price indices (Shiller 
1993) for quality and narrow geographical subsets of the market, and consistently-formulated  
international home price indices. 
Governments also should subsidize fee-only financial advisers for everyone, so that they can 
get mortgage advice from other than just salespeople with vested interests. 
We need also to explore how to promote better use of our blossoming information 
technology, which makes possible vastly more complexity while retaining user friendliness. 
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